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THE COMPETENCY OF A WITNESS TO THE EXECUTION OF A WILL WHICH
NAMES HIM EXECUTOR.
In the recent case of lones v. Grierer (Illinois), 87, N. E. 295,
the oft mooted question as to the competency of a witness to
the execution of the will wherein he is named executor again arose. In
this case one Jeremiah Smith died, owning both real and personal estate.
He left a will by which he gave, absolutely, his personal property to his
sister, Matilda Jones, appellee, and gave her, also, the use of his real
estate during her natural life. To her son he devised the fee.
The executors, two in number, were also the attesting witnesses to the
will. The County Court held the attesting witnesses, by reason of the
fact that they were executors, incompetent, and refused to admit the
will to probate. On an appeal to the Circuit Court the witnesses were held
to be competent, and the will was admitted to probate. Hence the
prosecution of this appeal. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided that
the subscribing witnesses, named in the will as executors, were not com-
petent, per sc, to establish the will, but that they were rendered competent
by Section 8 of the Mills Act, Hurd's Stat., Ill., 1908 p. 2193.
By the common law, it is not essential to the validity of a will that it
should be attested by the witnesses. In Rc High, 2 Doug., (Mich.) 515.
Although at one time in England the meaning of the term "credible" as
applied to witnesses was the subject of some difference of opinion it is now
well Settled, in this country at least, that the word "credible" witness
means competent witness. So in construing our various Mill's Acts,
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wherein the term "credible" witness is generally used, we may substitute
the term competent witness. As a general rule, all persons are competent
witnesses to a will unless expressly excluded. The rule of the common
law has been held to be the standard by which the competency of attest-
ing witnesses is to be determined. Hitchcock v. Shaw, i6o Mass., 140.
Witnesses are deputed by law to protect the testator from any fraud,
imposition, coercion or restraint, and to confirm his last will and
testament as his voluntary and rational act. It is only natural then,
that the rule has been enforced that unless a witness at the time of
execution did not possess the qualities required, they cannot subsequently
be supplied. At common law there was some conflict of authority as
to whether the requisite competency in the attesting witness must exist
at the time of attestation, or when the will was offered for proof. I W.
BL., 366. Yet, it has never been doubted that subsequent incompetency will
not impair the validity of the attestation. Brograve v. Winder, 2 Vcs., Jr.,
636. In re Holt, 56 Minn. 33. By the Roman law wills were required to
be executed in the presence of both freemen and citizens. If, when the
will was executed, the witnesses did not have these qualifications, subse-
quent emancipation or grant of citizenship could not supply it. It is
right at this point, of competency at the time of execution, that commence
the divergence of the holdings of our various American courts; some of
our states holding that the commission to the executor constitute such
an interest as avoids the will, to which he is a necessary witness, but the
majority are emphatically opposed to such an idea.
On the one side it is urged that the commissions are neither a devise
nor a bequest, and hence that the executors are not relieved from incom-
petency by statutory provisions declaring incompetent such witnesses. At
the common law executors were not entitled to any compensation for their
time and trouble. So long ago as Lord Hale's time it was settled that
an executor who had no interest in the surplus was a good witness to
prove the will. I Mod. io7; Bettison v. Bromley, 12 East, 250. But as
the English law did not allow compensation, we need not look to their
decisions for direct authority upon the Question of Consideration.
In Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecc't Soc., Conn. 254, although the point of
compensation to an executor acting as attesting witness to the will,
wherein his office had been created, was directly relied upon as a reason
to exclude the probating of the will, yet the court held the executor com-
petent, although "he was entitled to payment of his expense and compen-
sation for his services." lb. 263.
In Kentucky, where by statute the executor is allowed compensation
for his services, the court said, "An executor who has no interest in the
residuary fund, and no other interest than that of a fiduciary, is a com-
petent witness to prove the will, whereby his appointment is initiated."
In the will of McDaniel, 2 1. J. Marsh, 332.
In the case of John Randolph of Virginia, a question as to the com-
petency of one of the executors arose, and the court held that, "An
executor, in his transactions as such with the world, is the representative
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and legal owner of his testator's estate, responsible for its due adminis-
tration, identified with its interests, and bound to assert and defend them.
He cannot be a witness for himself in controversies with strangers affect-
ing the interests thus vested in him. Nor when he is called to account as
trustee by his cestuis que trust can he testify against them in relation to
the measure or extent of his responsibility. But what good objection can
there be to his competency amongst the cestuis que trust themselves, or
between two classes of person,, each claiming the interests rightfully be-
longing to cestuis quc trusts? The estate which the executor represents
is in no wise interested in such a contest. Nor has he himself any
personal interest in it. As to his losing the office of executor, by a vacation
of the will, it is no loss in the eye of the law, which regards it, not as a
lucrative employment, but as an onerous engagement, accepted from dif-
ferent considerktions than pecuniary emolument. His commissions are
designed merely to reimburse him for his labor and expenses; and if he
should lose them prospectively he will be at the same time relieved from
the services and responsibilities for which they are allowable." Coalter's
Excc'rs, et al., v. Byron and wife et al. L Grat. 87, 89.
It was held in the New Hampshire court that the compensation
allowed to an executor for his services was provided for by statute, and
is not a gift under the will, and hence that he is a competent subscribing
witness. Stewart v. Harriman, 5o N. H., 25. Mississippi in the case
of Rucker v. Lambdin, 20 Miss. 230; Sand M. 12, holds that a subscribing
witness to a will is not incompetent to testify in support of it, by the fact
that he is named in the will as executor. The Missouri courts in Murphy
v. Murphy, 24 Mo. 526; as do the Pennsylvania courts in Snyder v. Bull,
r7 Pa. 54, hold the same. Instances of this doctrine in a majority of the
states can be greatly multiplied.
The reason for the exclusion of a legatee or executor as a witness to
a will, is on the ground of interest alone. But to make one an executor,
there is something necessary beyond the mere appointment in the will.
He must assume the duties. If he refuses to qualify and the refusal be
entered of record and administration be granted, he is not, and he cannot
be executor. Williams on Ex'rs., 153, 155. If he refuse, then he has never
had any interest, for a man cannot be made executor against his will.
Hence it is that we find so many decisions based either upon statute
or judiciary reasoning, allowing the competency of a witness after he has
renounced his executorship. So, too, the credibility of attesting witnesses
must be judged as of the period of attestation. This is so held, that an
avoidance of the will cannot be brought about.- A subsequent disability
of a witness will not prevent the will being proved and allowed. What
definite interest is there to the executor in the will of a testator? No
living man has an executor. The will is certainly ambulatory until the
death of the maker. Even then the executorship is not absolute. The
executor may not accept, and should be then a good witness. Though
he might eventually be a good executor, still he might not be. He might
die in the lifetime of the (to be) testator; or his nomination mi ight be
revoked, or he might not find it convenient to accept. Although he may
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have in view the executorship, yet a contingent interest does not disqualify
a witness at the time of deposing nor for an equal reason; at the time
of attestation. Had there been a renunciation, the witness might have
been sworn, yet his renunciation would not have been a release of an
intermediate interest.
In contemplation of law, an executorship is not an office of profit.
The design of the allowance to the executor in this country is compensa-
tion, in England the services are gratuitous. It is sometimes more and
seldom less, but by supposition the executor gets only what he has earned.
In case his returns are too large, it is the fault of the court and not of the
law. "Unlike a legatee, he is not the testator's beneficiary. Though the
bare appointment of an executor constitutes a testacy, yet since his con-
tingent right to the surplus was taken away, the office has been a naked
trust." Snyder v. Bull, supra. For, if an executor had anything beyond
a mere naked office under the will, then upon his death, before services
rendered, his representatives would be entitled to it. Then, it must follow,
that it is not the will but the law of services rendered after the grant,
which entitles one to remuneration.
On the other hand in those jurisdictions where an attesting witness
is not allowed to be an executor under the same instrumeat, and the
appointment to the office of executor is an appointment to an office
yielding emolument, then it must follow that an executor under such
a will is an incompetent witness.
It was held in the case of Taylor v. Taylor, I. Rich. 53', "that the
statute 25 George III, c. 6 was in force in South Carolina but did not ex-
tend to personal estate, and that one appointed executor, by his right to
commissions, takes an interest by the will, which renders him an incom-
petent witness." The English courts having held that the statute of George
II did not apply the wills of personalty, because they required no attesta-
tion. L Jarm, 65; Emanuel v. Constable, 3 Russ. 436.
In the case of Tucker v. Tucker, 5 Iredell (Law), I61, the court of
North Carolina expressed its regret that the policy of the statute of
George II. had not been adopted in that state, and there held "that the
executor was not a competent witness upon the trial of an issue devisavit
vel non, because of his legal right to commissions on the personal estate.'
From the language employed in both of these cases, it seems only reason-
able to assume, that if a similar statute to that of George II. had been in
force in those states, the executors would have been admitted as com-
petent witnesses.
In the case of Allison's Ex'rs. v. Allison, 4 Hawks 141,, it was decided
that one who had been appointed a trustee to sell lands inder a will, and
had also been appointed executor, was not a competent attesting witness.
This same rule was adopted, at one time, in New York, although, as said
by Judge Harris, "with hesitation.' Burritt v. Sullivan, 6 Barb. 198.
In Pennsylvania, where two executors brought an action, it was held
that one of them was not a competent witness, although he offered to make
a deposit sufficient to cover all costs, because of his interest in the com-
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mission on the estate. Gebhart v. Gebhart's Ex'rs, 15 Serg. and Raw. 235.
Anderson v. Neff, ii Sand R. 208, in the same court again adopted 
that
theory. However, see the case of Snyder v. Bull, supra, decided twenty-
five years later, and which has largely acted as a basis for subsequent
decisions.
In Gass' Heirs v. Gass' Ex'rs, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that since the statute 25 George II, was not in force there, that a legatee
could not be-a good attesting witness. 3 Humph. 279.
In the case of Sears v. Dillingham, 12 Mass. 358, it was held that the
executor was an incompetent witness, because liable to costs. The court
proceeds to say, "that by the common law, an executor, who is not a
residuary legatee, and has the beneficial interest in the estate may be a
witness to prove the execution of the will." "The competency must exist
at the time of the attestation: a subsequent incompetency will not affect
the formal execution of the will, otherwise the commission of crime, which
renders infamous, or the succession to an estate under a devise, would
disable a witness who was free from crime or interest at the time of
subscribing." "If, then, the executor was a competent witness at the time
he attested the will, there can be now no legal obligation to it because of
his subsequent incompetency. He appears to derive no interest whatever
under the will, not being residuary legatee, nor having any desire or be-
quest in it."
As late as nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, it was held "that if
a will provid a pecuniary benefit to the attesting witness though depend-
ant upon the happening of a contingency, he has a beneficial interest under
it; and if the contingency does not happen. that fact does not relate back
and restore competency. In re Trinitarian Congregational Church and
Society of Castine, 91 Me., 416.
So the law stands in the various states. The confusion in the results,
and the opposite views on the same set of facts, proving that all of these
conclusions cannot rest upon correct principles. Yet, the preponderance
of weight makes an executor a competent witness, and most of the cases
cited in negation of this principle are of anything but recent date. There
is a decided tendency of recent years toward abrogating the doctrine of
not allowing an executor to prove the will, and toward substituting, by
both judicial decisions and statutory provisions-plainly making such a
line of decisions incumbent upon the courts-a rule allowing this right to
prove, to one who has been named executor. Some states require re-
linquishment of the executorship by the person named as executor, before
he can become a competent witness. Others do not. That the will shall
not be defeated for lack of technical attestation, seems to be a principle
becoming more and more firmly carried out by the courts each year. The
whole current of English cases are strongly set toward the proposition
that the appointment to the office of executor does not disqualify. Bettison
v. Bromley, 12 East, 250. Phipps v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt. 219. It is the interest
which the executor takes under the will whicl has that effect. For, without
the statute, the executor would not be entitled to his commission. The
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question, tlen. turns upon the point, when does the beneficial interest of
the executor accrue? Because the will confers no pecuniary benefit upon
him, he cannot have an interest at the time of attestation. Here is one
difference between him and the executor who took the residuum at common
law. So. too, at the probate of the will the executor has no interest. For
what if he renounce the trust, or be not able to give the named security?
Until the grant of the letters testamentary there is no interest. Both the
attestation and the probate precede this. The right to commissions, so far
from taking effect through relation to the time of attestation, has not
accrued until the services have been performed, and the allowance is not
made until there has been a final settlement of the estate, or the close
of the ad'iinistration. See Merrill v. Moore's Heirs, 7 How., Miss. 293.
If in point of fact, the executor does not administer the estate, he is
entitled to no compensation, for commissions are allowed upon the whole
estate administered. Does it not follow that, that "certain, immediate legal
interest" in the witness, at the time of attestation, which is necessary
to render him incompetent, is not present ?" See II. Grccne, Ev. 455.
The Illinois court in Jones v. Grieser. supra, the case under discussion,
is of the opinion that an executor has "such a direct financial interest in
the probate of the will that he is disqualified by reason of such interest as a
witness to the execution of the will," and "that he has an interest in the
probate of the will to the extent of his commissions as executor," and "that
the true test of interest of such witness is whether he will gain or lose
financially as the direct result of the proceeding," and since commissions
are a direct gain the executor is an incompetent witness. However, in the
present case, statutes of the state of Illinois removed the objection to the
witnesses to the will in question, because these witnesses fell within
the purview of the state statutes made to regulate just* such condi-
tions. The Illinois court, in view of the previous decisions of that political
authority, could not have decided differently than they did, and at the
same time carried out the doctrine of stare decisis as laid down by former
courts of that state. That the view of the Illinois court in holding that
"the interest which he (the executor) has, however, like that of a devisee
or legatee grows out of and by virtue of the execution of the will," and
that "an executor is not a competent witness to the execution of a will
which names him executor," is plainly the holding of the minority of the
states of this country, and is against the interpretation of the majority,
and also the interpretation given to the same proposition by the English
courts, cannot be controverted. For in these jurisdictions, the executor
has not an office of emolument, but, as Lord Ellenborough has aptly put it,
"The executor takes no interest under the will. but only a burthensome
trust." Betteson et aL, v. Bronl,. 12 East. 250; Lozc v. loliff, r H1. B.
365.
UNFAIR COMPETITION AS APPLIED TO UNPATENTED ARTICLES.
It is well settled that after the expiration of a patent, a person's right
to monopolize the manufacture and sale of the patented article ceases.
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Robinson, Patents, Vol. III, Sect. 9o8. And necessarily one has no right
to the monopoly of an article which is not patented.
A delicate point, and the crucial one in the question of unfair com-
petition, arises as to how far the right to copy such an article exists. The
rule is well stated in the case of Muiller Mfg. Co. v. McDonald & Mor-
rison Mfg. Co., 164 Fed. ioor, decided in October, i9o8, in the eighth circuit.
where the court says: "Irrespective, however, of any question of trade
mark, rival dealers have no right to dress their goods in simulation of
those of their competitors, or by simulative devices mislead the purchasing
public into buying their goods in the belief that they are those of their
rivals in trade."
The doctrine of unfair competition as applied to unpatented articles is
to be distinguished from the trade mark cases. In the case of trade marks
the encroachment lies in the misrepresentation as to the origin of the
article. Here it lies in copying the form and appearance of an article in
non-essential details for the purpose of taking advantage of another's
reputation. Due to the fact that the federal courts are continually called
upon to consider patent and trade mark cases and allied subjects, it is
not perhaps to be wondered at that this subject has been developed rather
more fully in their decisions than elsewhere.
One of the earlier cases in which this question came before the courts
was Fairbanks v. Jacobs. 14 Blatchf. 337, decided in 1877. The plaintiff
was the manufacturer of the well known Fairbanks scales. Some time
after the expiration of the patent on them. the defendant put upon the
market exact copies of the plaintiff's product. In fact it was proved that
parts of the plaintiff's scales had been used as patterns from which the
castings for the defendant's scales were taken. 'The court said: "Anyone
may make anything in any form and may copy with exactness that which
another has produced without inflicting any legal injury, unless he attri-
butes to that which he has made a false origin, by claiming it to be the
manufacture of another person." An injunction was refused, however,
because there was no proof of actual deception. So when an article is
unpatented the public may copy it exactly as long as they do not deceive
purchasers as to its origin.
Another early case was Coates v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U. S. 562
(1893). The plaintiff had patented certain devices for stamping the
periphery of spools. After the expiration of the patent the defendant
used this device for the same purpose and in the same manner in which
the plaintiff had used it. However, the defendant did not copy the arbitrary
and non-essential details of the embossing of the plaintiff. The court held
that the defendants had acted well within their rights. but said that no one
had a right "by imitative devices, to beguile the public into buying their
wares under the impression that they are buying those of their rivals."
p. 566.
One of the most important recent cases in which this doctrine was
before the court. important for the reason that the complainant's case
rested solely on the doctrine, was Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers. Frary
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and Clark, i31 Fed. 24o (June, i94), decided by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Here the complainant was the maker
of the well known coffee mills which are seen to-day in almost every
grocery store. These mills had been made for thirty years in the same
shape and with the same color and ornamentation, and had thereby be-
come well known to the public in general. The defendant, wishing to
put a coffee mill on the market, made "Chinese copies" of the com-
plainant's mill. The court held in granting the complainant an injunction
that where there is "a Chinese copy, such as the defendants offer the
public" proof of intent to deceive and actual deception is unnecessary.
"A Court of Equity will not allow a man to palm off his goods as those
of another, whether his representations are made by word of mouth, or,
more subtly, by simulating the collocations of details of appearance by
which the consuming public has come to recognize the product of his
competitor." The part of this decision which holds that proof of actual
deception is not necessary extends the doctrine beyond the limit of Fair-
banks v. Jacobs, supra. In accord with Enterprise v. Landers, supra, is
the case of Yale and Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (i9o7), de-
cided also in the Second Circuit by the same judges who sat on the case
of Enterprise v. Landers, supra. After stating that many of the features
of the plaintiff's padlock could with all propriety be adopted separately by
anyone, the court held that since the plaintiff was the first one to assemble
those features together and that in such a shape they had become well
known to the public, it was unfair competition for anyone to so combine
the features and to so dress his lock as to deceive the purchasing public
as to its origin.
A decision by the same court in the Second Circuit nearly contem-
poraneous with the decision of Enterprise v. Landers, supra, brings out
clearly how much one may or may not copy. It was held not to be unfair
competition to copy the details of construction and form of an unpatented
article when those details were essential to the construction of any device
which was to be used for the same purpose. Marvel v. Pearl, 133 Fed.
161 (Oct., i9o4). Thus one has the absolute right to copy all essential
details of an unpatented article, but the non-essential, distinctive character-
istics, those things which are valueless in the mechanical construction or
usefulness of the article, cannot be copied in such a way as to defraud
the public, and proof of such deception will be implied where exact
duplicates are produced.
Between the realms of mechanical and design patents there is a
middle ground occupied by a class of devices not susceptible of patenting,
and yet, which exhibit some degree of artistic taste and ingenuity in their
conception. This doctrine affords some protection to this class of devices,
for when a man has adopted an arbitrary non-essential form and when
the public has come to differentiate between his product and that of others
by the peculiar form, he has a property right in it, analogous to a "good
will," which should be and is protected. Unless a person intends to defraud
and to get the benefit of another's reputation he cannot be prejudiced by
being compelled to adopt some other form, since the form which is pro-
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tected is entirely non-essential to the utility or mechanical value of the
product. As has been very well said: "The power of courts of equity
to restrain unfair competition is a very beneficent one, and is founded upon
a basis of sound business morality." Ludlow Valve Co. v. Pittsburg Mfg.
Co., 166 Fed. 26.
C. E. H., Jt.
